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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Karie T. Cooke entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of 
a controlled substance (morphine), preserving his right to challenge the district court's 
order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Cooke asserts that the district court erred in 
denying his Motion to Suppress. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Cooke was driving his pickup truck when he was pulled over by Trooper 
Moore for not having proper mud flaps pursuant to Idaho Code section 49-949. 
(Tr. 9/17/14, p.7, L.7 p.8, L.13.) After stopping Mr. Cooke, Trooper Moore determined 
that he was driving with a suspended license and arrested him. (R., pp.97-98.) During 
a search incident to arrest, Trooper Moore found six morphine pills in Mr. Cooke's 
pocket. (R., p.98.) Mr. Cooke was subsequently charged with possession of a 
controlled substance (morphine). (R., pp. 24-25, 122-123.) 
Mr. Cooke filed a Motion to Suppress challenging Trooper Moore's initial 
detention. (R., pp.94-96.) In his motion, Mr. Cooke alleged that his vehicle was in 
compliance with section 49-949, and therefore Trooper Moore did not have reasonable 
suspicion to detain him. (R., p.96.) Specifically, Mr. Cooke argued that his mud flaps 
were compliant with section 49-949 because they meet the specifications set forth in 
section 49-949(2)(b ), which requires that mud flaps be "constructed as to be capable at 
all times of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substance as may be 
picked up and carried by wheels." (R., pp.98-99.) Additionally, Mr. Cooke argued that 
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section 49-949(1 )(c) creates an exception for vehicles that have factory-built bumpers 
fastened directly to the frame of the vehicle and, because his truck has a factory-built 
bumper, section 49-949(1 )(c) applies to his vehicle, rather than 49-949(1 )(a), which 
governs mud flap length requirements for trucks. (R., p.99.) Following a hearing, the 
district court denied Mr. Cooke's Motion to Suppress. (R., p.122.) The district court 
held that section 49-949(1 )(a) applied to Mr. Cooke's vehicle and Mr. Cooke's mud flaps 
were not in compliance; therefore, Trooper Moore had reasonable suspicion sufficient to 
stop the vehicle. (R., pp.126-128.) 
Mr. Cooke entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (morphine), preserving his right to appeal the denial his Motion 
to Suppress. (Tr. 10/31/14, p.6, Ls.6-11.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Cooke's motion to suppress? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Cooke's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Cooke claims that the district court erred when it denied his Motion to 
Suppress because his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Trooper Moore 
detained him without reasonable suspicion. He requests that the district court's order 
denying his Motion to Suppress be reversed. 
8. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals 
articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At 
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
Id. at 302 (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Cooke's Motion To Suppress 
Because His Truck Was Not In Violation Of Idaho Code Section 49-949 And, 
Therefore, The Initial Detention Was Improper 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of this constitutional right is to "impose a standard 
of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby 
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safeguard an individual's privacy and security against arbitrary invasions." State v. 
Maddox, 1 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct App. 2002). An investigative detention is 
constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable suspicion, derived from specific 
articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 21 (1968); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 264 (Ct. App. 
2001 ). 
Mr. Cooke argues on appeal that his detention was illegal because his vehicle 
was in compliance with Idaho Code section 49-949. At the suppression hearing, 
Trooper Moore testified that he detained Mr. Cooke because the mud flaps on his 
pickup truck were not in compliance with sections 49-949(1 )(a) and 49-949(2)(a), in that 
the flaps were too short and too narrow. (Tr. 9/17/13, p.8, Ls.1-13, p.13, Ls.12-18.) 
The district court held that Idaho Code section 49-949(1 )(a) applied to Mr. Cooke's 
truck, requiring that the length of the mud flaps be no more than 10 inches from the 
ground. (R., p.127.) The court based its holding on its finding that Mr. Cooke's truck 
was a pickup truck, as defined in Idaho Code section 49-121(10), which defines a 
"pickup truck" as "[e]very motor vehicle eight thousand (8,000) pounds gross weight or 
less which is designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property." 
Although Mr. Cooke does not disagree with the finding that his truck meets the definition 
of a pickup truck, he maintains that a different subsection should apply to his truck 
because it has a factory-built bumper fastened directly to the frame. (R., pp.101-103.) 
Mindful of the fact that section 49-949(1 )(c) only applies to vehicles "other than trucks," 
Mr. Cooke argues that under section 49-949(1 )(c) the length of his mud flaps were in 
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compliance with the law because trucks with factory-built bumpers fastened directly to 
the frame are exempt from the mud flaps length requirement. (R., p.103(a).)1 
Additionally, Mr. Cooke argues on appeal that his mud flaps were in compliance 
with section 49-949 because they are "constructed as to be capable at all times of 
arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substance as may be picked up and 
carried by wheels," as required by section 49-949(2)(b). (R., p.101.) Mindful of the 
existence of section 49-949(1 ), which designates specific length requirements for mud 
flaps on trucks, and section 49-949(2)(a), which designates width requirements for mud 
flap on all vehicles, Mr. Cooke asserts that compliance with section 49-949(2)(a) is all 
that the statute requires. Despite the district court's finding that no evidence was 
presented that Mr. Cooke's mud flap were capable of deflecting dirt, mud, water, or 
other substances, Mr. Cooke asserts that that his mud flaps and the fenders around his 
wheel wells were capable of doing so. (R., p.127; Exhibits A, B.) 
Mr. Cooke maintains that the mud flaps on his truck were in compliance with 
section 49-949 and, therefore, Trooper Moore did not have reasonable suspicion to 
detain him. 
D. All Evidence Collected Following Mr. Cooke's Illegal Detention Should Be 
Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 
1 The record contains Mr. Cooke's Motion to Suppress in its entirely, which consists of 
ten pages not including attachments. Although page 9 of 10 appears in the record, it is 
not Bates stamped. Thus, page 8 is stamped as 103 and page 10 is stamped as 104. 
For ease of reference, page 9 of 10 of Mr. Cooke's Motion to Suppress will be cited as, 
"R., p.103(a)." 
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371 U.S. 4 71 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is 
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371 
U.S. at 488. Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would 
not have come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. 
Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Mr. Cooke maintains that Trooper Moore illegally detained him. Had Mr. Cooke 
not been illegally seized, the six morphine pills would not have been discovered. 
Mr. Cooke asserts that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the evidence 
is untainted; therefore, the evidence must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and 
commitment, reverse the order denying his Motion to Suppress, and remand the case to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2014. 
KIMBERLY E. SMITH 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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